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Regional powers and their strategies: empire,
hegemony, and leadership
SANDRA DESTRADI*
Abstract. Regional powers are often conceived of as ‘regional leading powers’, states which
adopt a cooperative and benevolent attitude in their international relations with their
neighbours. The article argues that regional powers can follow a much wider range of
foreign policy strategies in their region. Three ideal-typical regional strategies are identified:
empire, hegemony, and leadership. The article is devoted to a theory-led distinction and
clarification of these three terms, which are often used interchangeably in the field of
International Relations. According to the goals pursued, to the means employed, and to
other discriminating features such as the degree of legitimation and the type of self-
representation by the dominant state, the article outlines the essential traits of imperial,
hegemonic, and leading strategies and identifies sub-types for better classifying hegemony
and leadership.
Sandra Destradi is a Research Fellow at GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, Hamburg,
Germany. Her current research focuses on India’s foreign policy, with a particular interest
in India’s strategies in its South Asian regional neighbourhood, as well as on mediation in
intra-state wars.
Introduction
The increased international weight of countries such as China, India, Brazil, and
South Africa has attracted scholarly attention to these countries of the ‘South’ and
to their assumed roles not only as ‘emerging powers’ in the economic field but also
as ‘system challengers’ or new norm builders in contexts like the World Trade
Organization negotiations.1 At the same time, the end of the Cold War great power
‘overlay’ and the salient relevance of regions as units of analysis2 induced several
scholars to deal with the role of these emerging powers as dominant states in their
* I would like to thank Joachim Betz, Cord Jakobeit, Bert Hoﬀmann, Nadine Godehardt, and the
journal’s reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
1 See, for example, Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for
Would-be Great Powers?’, International Aﬀairs, 82 (2006) pp. 1–19; Chris Alden and Marco Antonio
Vieira, ‘The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism’, Third
World Quarterly, 26 (2005) pp. 1077–95; Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Mônica Hirst, ‘Brazil
as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities’, International
Aﬀairs, 82 (2006) pp. 21–40.
2 See, the special issue, ‘Globalising the Regional, Regionalising the Global’, Review of International
Studies, 35, Supplement S1 (2009). On the notion of ‘overlay’, see Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver,
Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003).
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respective regions. The (new) regional powers are assumed to strongly influence the
interactions taking place at the regional level, thereby contributing in a significant
way to shaping the regional order, or, in other terms, the degree of cooperation or
conflict or the level of institutionalisation in their regions.3 As outlined in the
introductory chapter to this special section, despite the increasing scholarly interest
in these ‘regional powers’, however, few attempts have been made to go beyond
single empirical case studies and theorise about these states, identify their essential
traits, define them, or make sense of the way they are involved in the shaping of
the regional order in their respective regions. This article aims to contribute to this
debate by developing a broader conceptualisation of regional powers through the
identification of ideal-typical strategies these states might pursue in their relations
with regional neighbour countries.4 To this end, I first briefly deal with existing
conceptualisations of regional powers and show the gap in the literature which
needs to be filled. In fact, while structuralist approaches neglect the problem of
regional powers’ strategies, more actor-centred theorisations on regional powers
tend to focus on one particular strategy or behaviour, thereby leading to a flawed
and only partial conceptualisation of regional powers. Starting from notions used
in the literature analysed, I stress the need to study regional powers’ strategies as
being placed on a continuum reaching from a unilateral, highly aggressive and
coercive strategy, which I call ‘imperial’, to an extremely cooperative one, aimed at
reaching common goals, which I call ‘leading’. In the middle of this continuum,
I argue, there are diﬀerent kinds of ‘hegemonic’ strategies. Since the terms
‘empire’, ‘hegemony’, and ‘leadership’ are subject to extreme conceptual confusion
in IR literature, the central part of the article is devoted to a theory-led conceptual
distinction and clarification of these three notions. On this basis, I develop an
ideal-typical taxonomy of possible strategies pursued by regional powers. In the
concluding section, I outline a broader and more diversified conceptualisation
of regional powers and suggest a simple operationalisation of the notions of
empire, hegemony, and leadership for the empirical analysis of regional powers’
strategies.
1.Theoretical approaches to regional powers
While the term ‘regional (great) powers’ is widely used and relatively uncontested,
the salient features and the constitutive character of these countries is still
3 See Detlef Nolte, Macht und Machthierarchien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Ein Analyse-
konzept für die Forschung über regionale Führungsmächte, GIGA Working Paper No. 29 (2006),
p. 25. See also, David A. Lake, ‘Regional Hierarchy: Authority and Local International Order’,
Review of International Studies, 35 (2009) pp. 35–58. On regional order, see Nadine Godehardt and
Oliver W. Lembcke, Regionale Ordnungen in politischen Räumen. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie regionaler
Ordnungen, GIGA Working Paper No. 124 (2010).
4 In using the term ‘strategy’, I refer to the integration of political, economic, and military aims for
the preservation and realisation of states’ long-term interests, that is, what is commonly named
‘grand strategy’ in order to distinguish it from the purely military art of using battles to win a war.
See Paul Kennedy, ‘Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition’, in Paul
Kennedy (ed.), Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, Conn./London: Yale University
Press, 1991), pp. 1–7. For a ‘classical’ but more restrictive view of grand strategy, see Basil Henry
Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York, NY: Meridian, 21991), pp. 321–2.
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debated.5 Among the few aspects concerning regional powers which seem to be
uncontested in the literature are the following assumptions: a) that these states
belong to the region considered; b) that they display a superiority in terms of
power capabilities, that is, that they possess the largest power share in the region
and, c) that they exercise some kind of influence on the region.6
One of the most influential recent studies on regions, Buzan and Wæver’s
Regions and Powers, does not explicitly deal with the strategies pursued by regional
powers.7 The authors’ research interest lies, in fact, in structural considerations: the
structure of the region, or in their terminology, of the Regional Security Complex
(RSC),8 depends on the power relations between the involved states and the
‘patterns of amity and enmity’ originating from geographical proximity.9 In this
context, regional powers are merely conceptualised in terms of the possession of
power capabilities, as countries determining the polarity of the RSC on the basis
of the regional distribution of power.10
Lemke, in a similar fashion, follows a structuralist approach, but regional powers,
or in his words, the dominant states of a ‘local hierarchy’, are of central importance
for his theorising.11 In his extension of power transition theory to the regional level,
Lemke conceives of regions as hierarchical subsystems functioning like the inter-
national system, within which war and peace depend on the relative distribution of
power and on the status quo evaluations of the countries involved. In this framework,
regional powers are conceptualised as ‘local dominant state[s] supervising local
relations, by establishing and striving to preserve a local status quo’.12 However, by
choosing a structuralist approach, Lemke explicitly excludes a further investigation of
regional powers’ strategies from his study, even though he admits the potential
usefulness of incorporating strategic considerations into his theory.13
5 See, for example, Daniel Flemes and Detlef Nolte, ‘Introduction’, in Daniel Flemes (ed.), Regional
Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2010), pp. 1–14.
6 See Øyvind Østerud, ‘Regional Great Powers’, in Iver B. Neumann (ed.), Regional Great Powers in
International Politics (Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 12; Stefan A. Schirm, ‘Führung-
sindikatoren und Erklärungsvariablen für die neue internationale Politik Brasiliens’, Lateinamerika
Analysen, 11 (2005), p. 111; Nolte, Macht und Machthierarchien, p. 28, for whom the regional
power’s influence addresses issues such as the geo-political delimitation and politico-normative
construction of the region, regional governance structures, and the determination of the regional
security agenda; Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers; Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace
(Cambridge/New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Flemes and Nolte, ‘Introduction’.
7 For a more extensive discussion on the contribution by Buzan and Wæver, especially on their
diﬀerentiation between great powers and regional powers, see the introduction to this special section
by Detlef Nolte.
8 A Regional Security Complex is ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisa-
tion, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved
apart from one another’. Regions are therefore conceptualised in terms of security. Buzan and
Wæver, Regions and Powers, p. 44.
9 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, p. 45.
10 In so-called ‘standard’ RSCs, polarity is wholly defined by regional states; in this context, a unipolar
RSC would imply that the region contains only one regional power, but the structure of the RSC
would be anarchic anyway. On the contrary, in ‘centred’ RSCs the regional security dynamics are
either unipolar and dominated by a state which is a great power or a superpower or the RSC is
integrated by institutions rather than by a single power. See Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers,
pp. 55–62.
11 Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, p. 49.
12 Ibid.
13 Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, pp. 38–9. Somehow at the opposite end of the spectrum in
theorising about regional dynamics there are authors who, in the context of so-called ‘new
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If we want to make sense of the strategies adopted by regional powers in their
relations with neighbouring states and, consequently, of the influence they exert on
shaping the regional order, a more actor-centred approach is required. One of the
most comprehensive approaches dealing with regional powers’ behaviour and
strategies – and thereby following such an actor-based perspective – has been
developed by Nolte,14 who conceptualises regional powers as ‘regional leading
powers’ (Regionale Führungsmächte). Apart from the criteria of being part of the
region, possessing superior power capabilities, and eﬀectively exercising their
influence in the region, according to Nolte, regional leading powers not only claim
a ‘leading’ role in the region, but are also able to induce other states and actors
inside and outside the region to accept their leadership. Moreover, regional powers
are considered to act as advocates of regional interests in interregional and global
fora and to exercise a ‘cooperative hegemony’ in the regional context.15 In a more
recent study, Flemes and Nolte highlight that ‘[r]egional powers usually combine
leadership and power over resources’ and ‘have to bear a special responsibility for
regional security and for the maintenance of regional order’.16
Similarly, approaches deriving from the empirical study of single regional
powers focus almost exclusively on the assumed benevolent and integrative
character of the strategies pursued by these states – or posit that the adoption of
such strategies constitutes a prerequisite for defining a state as a regional power.
Thereby, however, ‘harder’ forms of the exercise of power are explicitly excluded
from conceptualisations of regional powers. For example, in her study about South
Africa, Schoeman argues that the essential features of regional powers are the
assumption of a stabilising and leading role in the region and the acceptance of this
role by neighbouring states.17 These issues are related to ‘taking responsibility for
those in need of assistance’ and being ‘an example to other countries in a number
of ways’.18 In a similar way, but with reference to Brazil, Schirm assumes that
regional powers aspire to – and ultimately succeed in – influencing the region in
the sense of rule-making since they dispose of power over material and organis-
ational resources and carry out ‘leading’ activities which are accepted by
neighbouring countries. Regional powers are therefore considered as role models
and leaders in their region.19 Similarly, Gratius observes the rise of Brazil to the
status of a ‘cooperative regional leading power’ which, by exclusively using soft
regionalism’ approaches, transcend the focus on nation-states and de-emphasise the role of power
capabilities in the shaping of regional order, displaying a low degree of interest in ‘regional powers’
and in the strategies these states pursue. See, for example, the volume edited by Fredrik
Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, Theories of New Regionalism (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2003).
14 See Nolte, Macht und Machthierarchien.
15 See Nolte, Macht und Machthierarchien, p. 28. The notion of cooperative hegemony was developed
by Pedersen in his analysis of strategies employed by regional powers in promoting regional
institutionalisation. See Thomas Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in
Regional Integration’, Review of International Studies, 28 (2002) pp. 677–96. On p. 683 Pedersen
defines cooperative hegemony as ‘[. . .] soft rule within and through cooperative arrangements based
on a long-term strategy’.
16 Flemes and Nolte, ‘Introduction’, p. 6.
17 See Maxi Schoeman, ‘South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994–2003’, in John Daniel,
et al. (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa 2003–2004 (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2003),
pp. 352–3.
18 Schoeman, ‘South Africa’, pp. 362 and 364.
19 See Schirm, ‘Führungsindikatoren und Erklärungsvariablen’, pp. 110–12.
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power, renounces to a ‘hegemonic’ role in South America.20 Burges in a similar
way resorts to the notion of ‘consensual hegemony’ to understand Brazil’s foreign
policy in the post-Cold War years, arguing that this notion implies an exercise of
influence through the dissemination of ideas or through the creation of disincen-
tives for other states to deviate from the course proposed by the regional power.21
This particular form of hegemony implies that the regional power leads a system
of states in a desired direction with the aim of reaching a ‘shared goal’ and not of
enforcing or imposing a particular order corresponding to its interests.22
All the approaches outlined above imply a conceptualisation of regional powers
which seems to be seriously flawed: regional powers are conceived of as states
pursuing exclusively benevolent, leading, integrating strategies. But even a super-
ficial look at the regional foreign policies pursued by states such as India or China,
which are often categorised as regional powers (in addition to – and not in conflict
with – their frequent classification as great or emerging powers),23 reveals that the
notion of regional ‘leading’ powers hardly corresponds to empirical reality, or that
the cases to which it is applicable are too rare to constitute a solid base for more
general theorising about regional powers. Recently, authors like Schirm and
Flemes/Wojczewski started acknowledging the diﬃculties regional powers face in
their eﬀorts to ‘lead’ the region, highlighting the ‘contested’ nature of leadership
and the need for the support of regional followers.24 However, these studies also
consider leadership to be the most typical form of strategy adopted by regional
powers. My argument, on the contrary, is that we should conceive a much broader
range of strategies regional powers can pursue in their relations with neighbouring
countries. Some authors have already been working in this direction. Pedersen, for
example, assumes that regional great powers might follow diﬀerent strategies –
unilateral hegemony, cooperative hegemony, empire, and concert – but in the end
he limits his attention to cooperative hegemony, which is considered the most
plausible strategy for a regional power to promote regional institutionalisation.25
Similarly, Prys has developed a classification of types of regional power with a
strong focus on the concept of regional hegemony,26 while Frazier and Stewart-
Ingersoll deal with diﬀerent regional power roles and orientations.27 Hurrell also
20 Susanne Gratius, Die Außenpolitik der Regierung Lula: Brasiliens Aufstieg von einer diskreten
Regional- zu einer kooperativen Führungsmacht, SWP-Studie S7 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, 2004).
21 See Sean W. Burges, ‘Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold
War’, International Relations, 22 (2008) pp. 65–84.
22 Burges, ‘Consensual Hegemony’, p. 73.
23 See, for example, Alden and Vieira, ‘New Diplomacy of the South’, p. 1080; Hurrell, ‘Hegemony,
Liberalism and Global Order’; Fuller and Arquilla, ‘Intractable Problem’, p. 610.
24 See Stefan Schirm, ‘Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance’,
European Journal of International Relations, 16 (2010) pp. 197–221; Daniel Flemes and Thorsten
Wojczewski, Contested Leadership in International Relations: Power Politics in South America, South
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, GIGA Working Paper No. 121 (2010).
25 See Pedersen, Cooperative Hegemony, pp. 681–2.
26 See Miriam Prys, What Makes a Regional Hegemon?, Paper presented at ECPR Joint Session of
Workshops, Helsinki (May 2007); Miriam Prys, Developing a Contextually Relevant Concept of
Regional Hegemony: The Case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and ‘Quiet Diplomacy’, GIGA Working
Paper No. 77 (2008).
27 See Derrick Frazier and Robert Stewart-Ingersoll, ‘Regional Powers and Security: A Framework for
Understanding Order within Regional Security Complexes’, European Journal of International
Relations, OnlineFirst (21 April 2010). Another approach, deriving from the German Development
Institute, defines ‘anchor countries’ as states that have a particular economic and political influence
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recognises that cases like the Russian intervention in Chechnya show us very
clearly to what extent great power politics and coercive approaches still matter,28
and discusses the possible existence of diﬀerent strategies pursued by regional
powers:
What of regions centred on powerful states? Such a situation may arise because the
regional state is so overwhelmingly dominant that it can enforce its will, or because it
succeeds in creating consensual hegemony within a region – maybe by providing economic
benefits, or by underpinning regional security, or by claiming to embody a particular view
of the world or set of values. Or it might arise when its regional position is actively
supported by those outside the region.29
However, as can be seen from the consideration of the approaches outlined above,
few serious attempts have been made so far to develop a broader and more
elaborate notion of regional powers that encompasses the diﬀerent strategies these
states may pursue. Therein lies the gap in the conceptualisation of regional powers:
the approaches outlined above mostly address single forms of behaviour or single
strategies of regional powers. What is missing is a single, generalisable conceptu-
alisation of regional powers able to grasp the commonalities of these countries and,
at the same time, to account for the diﬀerent foreign policy strategies these states
can pursue in dealing with their neighbours in the region.
If we start from a very basic notion of regional powers centred on the three
elements cited above (belonging to a region, superiority in power capabilities, and
exercise of some form of influence on regional neighbours), I argue that we can
further specify this conceptualisation by outlining the possible ideal-typical foreign
policy strategies these countries pursue. The best solution is to imagine regional
powers’ strategies as being located on a continuum, since this approach will allow
us to deal, in empirical analyses, with grey zones between diﬀerent strategies, as
well as with borderline cases.30 To this end, I start from two notions repeatedly
used in studies about regional powers – leadership and hegemony – and further
add the notion of empire as the opposite of leadership. As outlined above, a
unilateralist strategy based on the exercise of military power will be referred to as
‘imperial’, while at the other end of the spectrum, a cooperative one, targeted at
reaching common goals, will be conceived of as ‘leading’. Between these two ends
we find a ‘hegemonic’ strategy that needs to be further specified in terms of its
essential features.31 The notions of ‘empire’, ‘hegemony’, and ‘leadership’ are
particularly useful if we consider regional powers’ strategies as being located on a
continuum, since they are, as I will show later on, broadly comparable according
to a series of criteria, which thus allows for viable operationalisation. Moreover,
in their regional context. This influence can be either positive, a sort of ‘locomotive function’, or
negative, spreading stagnation and crises. See Andreas Stamm, Schwellen- und Ankerländer als
Akteure einer globalen Partnerschaft, DIE Discussion Papers, 1/2004 (2004), p. 7.
28 See Andrew Hurrell, ‘Regional Powers and the Global System from a Historical Perspective’, in
Daniel Flemes (ed.), Regional Leadership, p. 25.
29 Hurrell, ‘One World? Many Worlds?’, pp. 140–1.
30 See Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide (Princeton, NJ/Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2006), p. 34.
31 Similar forms of continuum with two poles and hegemony in the middle have been developed by
Heinrich Triepel, Die Hegemonie. Ein Buch von führenden Staaten (Stuttgart: Krauthammer, 1938),
p. 140; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd edition
(Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002) [1977], pp. 207–12; Prys, What Makes a Regional Hegemon?, pp. 3–4.
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empire, hegemony, and leadership are multifaceted concepts which reflect the
complexity of regional powers’ strategic considerations and the implications the
strategies adopted have for regional relations.
However, the terms ‘empire’, ‘hegemony’, and ‘leadership’ are highly contested
in IR literature and are often used in a confusing, inconsistent manner. Empire and
hegemony or hegemony and leadership are frequently employed as synonyms,
which makes an unequivocal identification of their meaning particularly problem-
atic. The following sections of this article are, therefore, devoted to a theory-based
distinction and clarification of these three concepts. Such a clarifying attempt goes
well beyond mere terminological debates since it represents the basis for the
development of a heuristic instrument for the analysis of regional powers’ strategies
in empirical research. Only through a broader and deeper understanding of the
whole range of strategies regional powers can adopt in dealing with neighbouring
countries – well beyond the exclusively cooperative or broadly hegemonic
approaches outlined above – will the development of a single, generalisable
conceptualisation of regional powers be possible.
2. Contested concepts: empire, hegemony, and leadership
In the discipline of IR, the notions of ‘empire’, ‘hegemony’, and ‘leadership’ have
taken centre stage in some important debates in the past decades. Since the 1970s,
but especially since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the US as the
‘only superpower’, increasing attention has been paid by IR theorists to the
strategies pursued by the US as the most powerful actor in the international
system. Washington’s course of action is seen by some authors as coercive
hegemony and by others as benevolent leadership.32 Meanwhile, a whole debate
has emerged in the past years about the US as an imperial power or a privileged
actor in a new global imperial order determined by globalisation.33
This ‘global level of analysis’ literature can be applied to the regional level
bearing in mind that the choice of the most appropriate strategy for a regional power
will depend on a wide range of factors related to the diﬀerent levels of analysis
involved – among others, the influence of ‘external’ great powers not belonging to
the region, the actions and reactions of regional neighbours, and domestic pressures.
2.1 Empire
A state which is clearly dominant in terms of material power resources has the
option of creating security for itself in an environment perceived as anarchical
32 For diﬀerent perspectives on US hegemony or leadership see among many others, Eric Hobsbawm,
‘War, Peace and Hegemony at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century’, in Chandra Chari (ed.),
War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World: The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First
Century (London/New York: Routledge 2008), pp. 15–24; Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘The Iraq War and
International Relations: Implications for Small States’, Cambridge Review of International Aﬀairs, 19
(2006) pp. 451–63; Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘Recovering American Leadership’, Survival, 50 (2008)
pp. 55–68.
33 See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University
Press, 2000). See also section 2.1.
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(according to the realist perspective) through the unilateral pursuit of its own
national interest, sustained by coercion and, if necessary, the use of military power.
In this study, I will call this kind of state strategy ‘imperial’.
Some authors – and here the terminological confusion becomes evident – have
defined states acting in this way as hegemons: ‘[. . .] hegemony is necessarily
coercive and based on the exercise of power; the hegemon must eﬀectively change
the policies of other states to satisfy its own goals’.34 This use of the term
hegemony, however, contrasts sharply with the widespread conception of
hegemony as benevolent leadership or the provision of public goods.
Besides these terminological problems, the lack of any kind of juridical or political
science-based specification has given the meaning of the term ‘empire’ a diﬀuse
character, leading to diﬀerent normative interpretations and abuses in its usage.35 In
the current debate about the ‘empire USA’ the term has become a synonym for the
US-dominated world order. This order is propagated by its advocates as clearly
power-based, militarily sustained, but ‘benevolent’ unilateralism;36 it is identified by its
opponents as a greedy system of subordination based on militarism and global
dominance.37 If we leave aside the concrete reference to US policy, what emerges from
this debate is, on the one hand, the controversial nature of the term empire38 and, on
the other hand, the fact that both advocates and opponents of the ‘empire USA’
associate this term with unilateralism and the use of military power.
In the contemporary nation-state based international system, the notion of
empire is freed from the association with territorial annexations, which is replaced
with the idea of ‘informal empire’. Empires can therefore be defined as ‘[. . .]
relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the
eﬀective sovereignty of other political societies’39 or, more precisely, as ‘structures
of transnational political authority that combine an egalitarian principle of de jure
sovereignty with a hierarchical principle of de facto control’.40
If empires or imperial relations imply a ‘substantial’ limitation to the
sovereignty of subject states,41 the degree to which sovereignty is limited – in a
34 David A. Lake, ‘Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or
Tattered Monarch with Potential?’, International Studies Quarterly, 37 (1993), p. 469. See also,
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the
Civilizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
35 See Herfried Münkler, ‘Staatengemeinschaft oder Imperium – Alternative Ordnungsmodelle bei
der Gestaltung von “Weltinnenpolitik”’, in Sabine Jaberg and Peter Schlotter (eds), Imperiale
Weltordung – Trend des 21. Jahrhunderts? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), p. 44.
36 See Robert Kagan, ‘The Benevolent Empire’, Foreign Policy, 111 (1998) pp. 24–35.
37 See among many others, Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American
Empire (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2000); Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s
Quest for Global Dominance (London: Hamilton, 2003). For an overview of the debate see for
example, G. John Ikenberry, ‘Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order’, Foreign
Aﬀairs, 83 (2004), pp. 144–54; the Forum on American Empire, Review of International Studies, 30
(2004) pp. 583–653; or the Forum in International Studies Perspectives, 9 (2008) pp. 272–330.
38 See Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 30; Ingo
Take, ‘(Schon) “Empire” oder (noch) “Hegemon”? Was uns die Hegemonietheorie über die
gegenwärtige US-Politik zu sagen hat’, in Sabine Jaberg and Peter Schlotter (eds), Imperiale
Weltordnung – Trend des 21. Jahrhunderts? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), p. 116.
39 Doyle, Empires, p. 19.
40 Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, ‘Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East
German State’, International Organization, 49 (1995), p. 695.
41 See David A. Lake, ‘The Rise, Fall and Future of the Russian Empire: A Theoretical Interpretation’,
in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds), The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR
in Comparative Perspective (Armonk, NY/London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 34–5.
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world where it already constitutes no more than a ‘cognitive script characterized
by organized hypocrisy’42 – cannot be definitively fixed in order to distinguish
imperial behaviour from other forms of hierarchical interaction, such as hegem-
ony.43 Nor can the degree of predominance in capabilities be used as an index
allowing an unequivocal demarcation between states or, more specifically, between
regional powers which will act as empires or as hegemons.44 The discriminating
element is instead represented by the means employed in the exercise of power,45
namely, in the case of empire, coercion and imposition. Coercion implies ‘[. . .]
making credible threats to which the target might or might not acquiesce, or
engaging in unilateral moves which undermine the bargaining position of the
weaker state’. Imposition means that ‘[. . .] the target is so weak that it has no
option but to comply with the preferences of the stronger’.46 Since these two
concepts, however, are also somehow elusive, the final distinctive feature of
imperial behaviour is represented by military intervention or its threat:
The depth and objects of centralized control vary. Within a given issue-area control can
range from proscribing a particular policy while still permitting significant local autonomy,
to prescribing one, in eﬀect vetoing all others [. . .]. It is diﬃcult to define how much
centralization is required for informal empire, but this is less important than the
expectation of intervention when rules are violated.47
Regional powers adopting an imperial strategy are forced to resort to the threat of
military intervention if subordinate states do not comply with their will, since
otherwise they risk losing their dominant position.48 As outlined by Knorr in his
remarkable contribution on diﬀerent forms of power, this threat may be
‘substantive’, which means specific and precise (for example, an ultimatum), or
‘inferential’, that is, more vague and implicit: ‘For example, to put some pressure
on B, who presumably knows what A wants, A may make vague domestic
statements about increasing military expenditure’.49
Analysing an assumed change of US policy from that of hegemony to that of
empire, Rapkin adds two further elements typical of imperial strategy: a preference
for unilateral problem solving and actions, and a sense of exemptionalism implying
the imposition of one’s own rules on others and, at the same time, the rejection of
rules contrasting with one’s interests (an oft-cited example is the US response to
42 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Rethinking the Sovereign State Model’, Review of International Studies, 27
(2001), p. 19.
43 Lake, who suggests that the distinction between empire and other hierarchical relationships between
polities should not be based on the analysis of the instruments of control but rather on the degree
of control itself, is not able to deliver a clear demarcation or definition of the ‘substantial rights of
residual control’ necessary to establish informal empire. See Lake, ‘Rise, Fall and Future of the
Russian Empire’, pp. 33–6.
44 See David P. Rapkin, ‘Empire and its Discontents’, New Political Economy, 10 (2005), p. 393.
45 See Take, ‘(Schon) “Empire” oder (noch) “Hegemon”?’, p. 117.
46 Krasner, ‘Rethinking the Sovereign State Model’, p. 18.
47 Wendt and Friedheim, ‘Hierarchy under Anarchy’, p. 697. Ikenberry proposes a similar understand-
ing of what he calls ‘highly imperial hegemonic order’ (one more example of terminological
ambiguity), which is based on the exercise of ‘coercive domination’ that the subordinate states
cannot counter through a strategy of balancing. See G. John Ikenberry, ‘American Power and the
Empire of Capitalist Democracy’, Review of International Studies, 27 (Special Issue) (2001), p. 196.
48 See Herfried Münkler, Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom Alten Rom bis zu den
Vereinigten Staaten (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2005), p. 30.
49 Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York,
NY: Basic Books, 1975), p. 10.
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the Kyoto Protocol).50 As a consequence, we can aﬃrm that imperial rule is always
illegitimate, if we conceive of legitimacy according to Habermas:51 in a hierarchical
interstate relationship the dominant position of the stronger state is legitimated if
the weaker states share its values and goals, that is, if a ‘consensual normative
order that binds ruler and ruled’52 is established. This decisive distinguishing factor
of empire – the threat or use of military power – implies, on the one hand, that
imperial strategy is mostly associated with a highly aggressive, intimidating policy
style and rhetoric;53 on the other hand, its illegitimate character and the lack of
consensus in imperial domination implies that empire is always accompanied by a
great dissatisfaction in subordinate states, which can lead to diﬀerent forms of
resistance54 or simply to inescapable subjugation if subordinate states are too weak
to resist.
2.2 Hegemony
While the identification of the essential features of empire is relatively simple, since
a sort of basic consensus seems to exist in the corresponding IR literature, the
meaning of ‘hegemony’ is much more diﬃcult to grasp. This can be traced back
to several reasons: firstly, hegemony is often used as a synonym for both leadership
and empire;55 secondly, it is employed by authors belonging to extremely diﬀerent
schools of thought with sometimes radically diverging research interests; thirdly,
like ‘empire’, also ‘hegemony’ has become a normatively loaded term, especially in
the context of the US debate and the alleged transition of the US from a
cooperative and benevolent hegemony to an egoistic and greedy empire.56 Because
of this greater complexity, the discussion of hegemony will require more attention
and ‘space’ in this study than that of empire, and will lead to a further
classification of and formation of subtypes of hegemonic strategies.
Hegemony, I argue in this study, is a form of power exercised through
strategies which are more subtle than those employed by states behaving as
imperial powers. The means through which power is exercised – and here the
distinction between hegemony and empire will become evident – can vary from the
50 See Rapkin, ‘Empire and its Discontents’, pp. 398–400.
51 See Jürgen Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1973), pp. 136–40, 144.
52 John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, International
Organization, 44 (1990), p. 289.
53 See Rapkin, ‘Empire and its Discontents’, p. 396.
54 See Münkler, Imperien, pp. 149, 189–200; Rapkin, ‘Empire and its Discontents’, p. 396; Doyle,
Empires, p. 40. For a discussion on authority, legitimacy, and hierarchy, see Lake, ‘Regional
Hierarchy’.
55 For an identification of hegemony with legitimate leadership see just to cite an example, Ian Clark,
‘Bringing Hegemony back in: The US and International Order’, International Aﬀairs, 85 (2009)
pp. 23–36. The undistinguished usage of hegemony and leadership goes back to the theory of
hegemonic stability (see section 2.2.1). Hegemony is used as a synonym for empire, among others,
by Wallerstein, Politics of the World-Economy, p. 38; Lake, ‘Leadership, Hegemony, and the
International Economy’, p. 469.
56 See for example, David P. Rapkin, ‘The Contested Concept of Hegemonic Leadership’, in David P.
Rapkin (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp.
3–4; Münkler, Imperien, pp. 11–6.
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exertion of pressure to the provision of material incentives, up to the discursive
propagation of the hegemon’s norms and values. The end of hegemonic behaviour
– and this, as we shall see, is the point that marks the diﬀerence between hegemony
and leadership – is always primarily the realisation of the hegemon’s own goals.
One of the most significant contributions on the issue of hegemony comes from
Antonio Gramsci, who analysed this concept with reference to the realm of social
relations in his Prison Notebooks.57 A social class, he argues, acts hegemonically if
it tries to establish a new order by formulating a universal ideology which brings
the interests of subordinate classes in line with its own interests – or presents and
aﬃrms its own interests as general interests for the whole society. Hegemony
implies the ability of the hegemon to let subordinates believe that power rests upon
the consensus of the majority.58 In this process, ideational and material power
resources are always operating together and influencing each other. According to
Gramsci, hegemony is and remains a form of dominance, even though it abstains
from the use of force. To represent power, Gramsci takes over Machiavelli’s
metaphor of the centaur: like the centaur, which is half human and half animal,
power is always two-fold, encompassing the use of force and coercion on the one
hand, and consensus and hegemony on the other.59 ‘To the extent that the
consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is
always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases. Hegemony is enough
to ensure the conformity of behaviour in most people most of the time.’60
Another ‘classical’ approach, which is even more neglected than the Gramscian
one by IR theory, is Heinrich Triepel’s.61 Triepel considers hegemony as a form of
power situated at an intermediate level on a continuum reaching from mere
influence to domination.62 As opposed to domination, hegemony is a tamed form
of power, characterised by a high degree of self-restraint on the part of the
hegemon.63 Triepel considers hegemony to be a particular kind of leadership, but
he underlines that in International Relations followership to a hegemon will not be
based on ‘joyful devotion’ as in the field of social relations, but rather on the
cost-benefit calculations of the weaker states, as well as on their recognition of their
own weakness.64
The contributions by Gramsci and Triepel embody the salient aspects later
discussed in diﬀerent strands of the IR debate on hegemony. These essentially
revolve around two interrelated points: around the very ‘nature’ of hegemony,
which is supposed to be either benevolent or coercive, and around the means
57 See Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere (Torino: Einaudi, 1975).
58 Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, p. 1638.
59 Ibid., p. 1576.
60 Robert W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method’,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 12 (1983), p. 164.
61 See Triepel, Die Hegemonie.
62 Triepel, Die Hegemonie, p. 140.
63 See Triepel, Die Hegemonie, pp. 39–40; 148–9. The idea of self-restraint with reference to hegemony
has been adopted by several authors: the role of institutions in signalling strategic restraint is
underlined by Andrew Hurrell, ‘Pax Americana or the Empire of Insecurity?’, International Relations
of the Asia-Pacific, 5 (2005), p. 173; for an analysis of the diﬃcult situation of hegemonic states in
managing a role conflict between their nature as great powers (and the corresponding inclination
towards unilateral action) and as ‘responsible’ hegemons constrained by the roles they have
established (‘paradox of hegemony’) see Bruce Cronin, ‘The Paradox of Hegemony: America’s
Ambiguous Relationship with the UN’, European Journal of International Relations, 7 (2001), p. 105.
64 See Triepel, Die Hegemonie, p. 144.
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employed to exercise hegemony, which are considered to be either material
(sanctions, rewards, incentives) or ideational (persuasion to accept norms and
values).
2.2.1 Benevolent vs. coercive hegemony65
The origins of this debate lie in the theory of hegemonic stability, originally
formulated by Charles Kindleberger in the context of a perceived decline in US
influence on world aﬀairs.66 Kindleberger argues that only a clearly preponderant
state in terms of material capabilities can stabilise the world economy. Moving
from an initially self-interested imperative, the creation of a stable environment for
its own development, the hegemon invests its resources to stabilise the system.
These stabilisation eﬀorts correspond to the provision of public goods to the other
states, which will act as free-riders and take advantage of the stability created by
the hegemon without sharing the costs.67 This kind of behaviour, which leads to
advantages for all the states in the system, is considered to be ‘benevolent’ by one
strand in the theory of hegemonic stability. The supposedly benevolent nature of
hegemony and its interpretation as not only a desirable but also an ideal condition
in the international system – the only one able to provide stability – have
contributed to the conceptual confusion between hegemony and leadership.
The introduction of a ‘negative’ connotation of hegemony is due to Gilpin, who
transposes the theory from the analysis of international economy to the broader
study of IR.68 Gilpin’s neo-realist approach, founded on an assumed marginal
utility maximisation by international actors, frees hegemony from its benevolent
stance and associates it more closely with the pursuit of national interests. The
hegemonic state provides public goods, in this case stability and peace, but it
imposes a sort of ‘tax’ on subordinate states, obliging them to contribute to the
costs of provision. Since the other states are too weak to exercise eﬀective
opposition, they will be forced to comply. However, possible benefits deriving from
the public goods provided could induce subordinate states to accept hegemony and
legitimise it. Herein lies the reason for the ‘egoistic’ provision of public goods by
65 ‘Benevolent’ and ‘coercive’ are normative terms. However, since they have marked a broad debate,
I will adopt them: ‘If it is impossible [. . .] to purge concepts of their contested appraisive dimension,
it is crucial that this dimension be explicitly acknowledged rather than swept under the illusory
carpet of objective neutrality’ (David P. Rapkin, ‘The Contested Concept of Hegemonic Leadership’,
in David P. Rapkin (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner,
1990), p. 4). But what is really of interest for this study is the question of ‘whose goals are pursued
by the hegemon, its own ones or those of a group of states?’ The answer to this question, as we shall
see marks the diﬀerence between hegemony and leadership.
66 See Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California
Press).
67 See Duncan Snidal, ‘The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’, International Organization, 39
(1985), p. 581. As Kenneth N. Waltz put it in his Theory of International Politics (New York, NY:
Random House, 1979), p. 198: ‘The greater the relative size of a unit the more it identifies its own
interests with the interests of the system. [. . .] Units having a large enough stake in the system will
act for its sake, even though they pay unduly in doing so’.
68 See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981).
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the hegemon: a cost/benefit calculation tells it that the realisation of its interests
through the establishment of an order acceptable for the other states is ‘cheaper’
than resorting to the use of force.69
Gilpin’s contribution marked the beginning of a debate in which a clearer
discrimination of the concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘leadership’ was attempted, and
the ambiguous nature of hegemony already taken into consideration by Gramsci
was highlighted.70 Snidal comes to the conclusion that hegemony can be
‘benevolent, coercive but still beneficial, or simply exploitative’.71 Lake, on the
other hand, tries for a broader distinction between ‘leadership theory’ and
‘hegemony theory’, which he believes are separate components in the theory of
hegemonic stability, both including, however, elements of coercion. Hegemony
theory, he argues, concerns the hegemon’s eﬀorts to create economic openness by
manipulating the trade policies of other states, which could prefer a closed
system.72 ‘Thus, hegemony is necessarily coercive and based on the exercise of
power; the hegemon must eﬀectively change the policies of other states to satisfy
its own goals.’73
Somewhere between these benevolent and coercive interpretations of hegemony
lies a more explicitly self-interested account of hegemony provided by power
transition theory. This approach is based on the idea of a hierarchical international
system where hierarchy depends on the distribution of material resources and
dominant states are supposed to be satisfied and interested in maintaining status
quo. The dominant state is thought to realise its main interest, the maintenance of
stability, by coopting (potential) smaller allies through the provision of incentives,
that is, of private goods.74
This debate demonstrates how the term hegemony has been adapted (and
deformed) to describe a whole range of strategies and behaviours, some of which
would be better defined as leading or imperial. Interestingly, all approaches
highlight the fact that the hegemon primarily follows its own interests. Also, in the
case of the provision of public goods, even if subordinate states gain more than the
hegemon, its primary aim is the establishment of a stable environment for itself.
The benefits deriving to subordinate states from this provision are essentially a sort
of by-product.
This insight corresponds to the assumptions made by neo-Gramscian authors
such as Cox, who argues that hegemony constitutes a subtle form of domination:
In the hegemonic consensus, the dominant groups make some concessions to satisfy the
subordinate groups, but not such as to endanger their dominance. The language of
consensus is a language of common interest expressed in universalist terms, though the
structure of power underlying it is skewed in favor of the dominant groups.75
69 See Snidal, ‘Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’, p. 587.
70 See Snidal, ‘Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’; Lake, ‘Leadership, Hegemony, and the
International Economy’.
71 Snidal, ‘Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’, p. 614.
72 See Lake, ‘Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy’, pp. 460–2, 469–78.
73 Lake, ‘Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy’, p. 469.
74 See Margit Bussmann and John R. Oneal, ‘Do Hegemons Distribute Private Goods? A Test of
Power-Transition Theory’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51 (2007), p. 89.
75 Robert W. Cox, ‘Labor and Hegemony (1977)’, in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds),
Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 421.
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2.2.2 Material vs. ideational power resources
While the debate about the benevolent vs. coercive character of hegemony
essentially takes place within rationalist approaches to IR, the other great debate
around the concept of hegemony, concerning the kind of power resources required
for and employed in the exercise of hegemony, sees an antagonism between
rationalist and constructivist approaches. For rationalist authors, the central
problem concerns the conversion of military and economic power resources into
political power since a hegemonic state is supposed to be predominant in terms of
material power resources.
Realists assume that hegemonic states provide material incentives to their
weaker counterparts in order to establish a stable international order. Both
hegemonic stability theory, with its emphasis on the provision of public goods in
the international economy, and power transition theory, which concentrates on the
provision of private goods to allies of the dominant power, focus on the role of
material incentives. Other realists, however, recognise the importance of moral and
normative factors in the successful establishment of hegemony.76 Thus, Gilpin
recognises that the distribution of power, which represents the ‘principal form of
control’,77 is not the only factor necessary for the maintenance of international
order: prestige (‘the probability that a command with a given specific content will
be obeyed’, even without the direct exercise of power)78 also counts, as well as a
set of rules imposed by the hegemon in order to advance its interests.79
At the other extreme, in opposition to realist theories, post-structuralist
accounts privilege the role of norms and ideas in the establishment of international
hegemony, which is characterised as discursive hegemony.80 The insight deriving
from this debate is that, apart from the ‘hardest’ realist accounts, most other
approaches to hegemony assume that material power factors and ideational aspects
such as norms, rules, value orientations, or, more generally, an influence on the
‘way to see the world’ interact in the exercise of hegemony. ‘These two ways of
exercising hegemonic power are mutually reinforcing and frequently diﬃcult to
disentangle’.81 In this case we can again refer back to Gramsci and the
neo-Gramscians, who underline the interplay between material and ideational
power resources ‘to found and protect a world order [. . .] universal in conception,
i.e. not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order which
most other states [. . .] find compatible with their interests’.82 While the employ-
ment of material power resources implies altering the incentives, that is, the costs
and benefits for other states of following diﬀerent courses of action,83 the
76 See John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, ‘The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, in David
P. Rapkin (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner, 1990),
pp. 50–1.
77 Gilpin, War and Change, p. 29.
78 Ibid., p. 31.
79 Ibid., p. 36.
80 See the article by Dirk Nabers in this special section.
81 Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, p. 286.
82 Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’, p. 171.
83 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, p. 287.
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employment of ideational power resources is considered necessary in order to gain
acceptance of the hegemonic state’s pre-eminent position, and thereby establish
some degree of consensus.84
This brief analysis of the main debates about hegemony highlights two essential
features of this concept:
a) Hegemony is essentially self-interested and aims primarily at the realisation of
the hegemon’s goals, which, however, are presented to subordinate states as
collective goals.
b) Hegemons operate by employing a combination of material incentives and
‘ideational’ power instruments (the changing or reshaping of norms and values
in the subordinate states) in order to gain consensus in the subordinate states.
For this reason, ‘[. . .] hegemony rests on a delicate balance between coercion
and consensus, between the exercise of the direct and indirect power of the
hegemonic state and the provision of a degree of respect for the interests of the
weaker states’.85 What makes the concept of hegemony so diﬃcult to define and
analyse is the wide range of policy options and strategies that a state defined as
‘hegemonic’ can pursue. The literature tells us that ‘some degree of consensus’ is
required and that a whole range of power resources, reaching from the imposition
of sanctions to the ‘normative persuasion’86 of subordinate states, can be utilised.
From the awareness of a variation in the exercise of hegemonic power derives a
widespread assumption that hegemony can assume diﬀerent, more or less unilateral
vs. cooperative or coercive vs. benevolent, forms, and that the diﬀerent character
of these types of hegemonic strategies depends on the kind of power resources
employed.87
In order to make the concept of hegemony suitable for empirical analysis, I
argue that a further specification and diﬀerentiation of forms of hegemony is
necessary, one which goes beyond the outlined benevolent/coercive and material/
ideational divides and combines these analytical categories into new sub-types.
Otherwise the fuzzy concept of hegemony can hardly be employed to study state
strategies in IR. Only a few attempts to go beyond mere assumptions of the
existence of diﬀerent kinds of hegemony, if not to build a taxonomy of forms of
hegemonic strategy or behaviour, have been made so far in IR theory.88 An initial
84 See Cronin, ‘Paradox of Hegemony’, p. 112; Hurrell, ‘Pax Americana’, pp. 172–3; Andrew Hurrell,
Hegemony and Regional Governance in the Americas, Global Law Working Paper 05 (2004);
Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, pp. 285–6.
85 Hurrell, ‘Hegemony and Regional Governance’, p. xxix.
86 Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 55.
87 See Snidal, ‘Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’, p. 614; Jonathan Joseph, Hegemony: A Realist
Analysis (London/New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), p. 129; Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony’,
p. 682.
88 Ikenberry argues that three kinds of hegemonic order exist: the first corresponds to what I have
defined as empire, since it is based on coercive domination; the second displays a certain, sometimes
minimal, convergence of interests and is held together by the provision of useful services to
subordinate states (security protection and access to the hegemon’s market); the third, defined as
‘open hegemony’, is more benevolent and acceptable to subordinate states, since the hegemon’s
power is restrained by rules and institutions. See Ikenberry, ‘American Power’, pp. 196–7. In his
article on ‘Cooperative Hegemony’, on p. 682–3, Pedersen distinguishes four possible strategies for
regional powers: unilateral hegemon (strong realist element and low institutionalisation), cooperative
hegemon (soft rule and high degree of institutionalisation), empire (strong realist element and high
level of institutionalisation), and concert (division of privileges and responsibilities among a group
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approach could be the broad division of hegemony into three subtypes, which I
will label as ‘hard’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘soft’ hegemony, according to the power
instruments employed. A further guiding framework for this diﬀerentiation will be
Ikenberry and Kupchan’s work on the legitimation of hegemony,89 since the more
or less eﬀective ‘manufacturing of consent’90 and the consequent degree of
legitimation depend on the hegemonic strategies used.
2.2.3 Forms of hegemonic strategy
If we exclude the use of military power or the threat of intervention, which is
typical for imperial power, the first form of hegemonic strategy, ‘hard’ hegemony,
can be conceived of as a system of domination based on coercion but exercised, as
Gramsci suggests, in a more subtle way. This means that the hegemonic state
primarily aims to realise its own goals and satisfy its own interests, but seeks to
hide this aspiration by emphasising, to some extent, a community of interests with
subordinate states. This kind of hegemonic strategy is based on a discrepancy
between the stated, rhetorical commitment to common goals by the hegemon and
the intention to act unilaterally and establish a sort of dominance over subordinate
states. Secondary states are forced to change their practices through sanctions,
threats, political pressure, and, to a lesser extent, inducements. This has been
suggested by Ikenberry and Kupchan in their ‘coercion’ model91 and by Pedersen
in his ‘unilateral hegemony’ model,92 as well as by most realist accounts. Another
element, which most authors do not explicitly mention, but which fits to this kind
of hegemonic strategy, is the exercise of political pressure or the imposition of
diplomatic and political sanctions (from protest notes and postponement or
cancellation of state visits to the suspension of diplomatic relations) on subordinate
states to induce them to fit into the hegemon’s hierarchical conception of order. A
particular form of pressure is represented by ‘threats of exclusion’,93 for instance,
in established international (or, in this case, regional) institutions. It takes place
of great regional powers). In his model of cooperative hegemony, on p. 686 Pedersen identifies two
further ideal types: The oﬀensive type is centred around the realisation of advantages of scale (access
to markets in the region), advantages of inclusion (access to raw materials), and advantages of
diﬀusion (propagation of the hegemon’s ideas). The defensive type of cooperative hegemony, in
contrast, primarily aims to stabilise the system. Hurrell identifies three models for the hegemonic
diﬀusion of norms and values: ‘progressive enmeshment’ (developed by liberalism), based on
emulation, learning, and normative persuasion; ‘hegemonic imposition’ (developed by neo-realism
and neo-dependency theories), based on coercion and, as the name says, imposition; and ‘coercive
socialization’, an intermediate model combining coercion and consensus to induce the incorporation
and internalisation of the hegemon’s ideas, norms, and practices. See Hurrell, ‘Hegemony and
Regional Governance’, pp. xxv–xxvi. Other classifications of hegemony relate, for example, to the
actors exercising it (collective, singular, coalitional hegemony). See Clark, ‘Bringing Hegemony back
in’.
89 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’ and ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic
Power’.
90 Wendt and Friedheim, ‘Hierarchy under Anarchy’, p. 700.
91 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 56.
92 See Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony’, p. 682.
93 Thomas Pedersen, ‘State Strategies and Informal Leadership in European Integration: Implications
for Denmark’, in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1999
(Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Aﬀairs, 1999), p. 91.
918 Sandra Destradi
particularly through the formation of (or the threat of forming) ‘sub-systemic
schemes’, from which subordinate states risk being excluded if they do not comply
with the hegemon’s wishes: ‘Members facing this kind of threat face the cost of not
being able to influence future decisions in a subordinate group provided that the
threat is credible.’94
To a great extent, the sanctions imposed by hard hegemons are of an economic
nature, for example, the denial of access to the hegemon’s market;95 the revocation
of trade agreements; or the reduction, intermission, or cancellation of foreign aid.
Financial sanctions and restrictions on travel are also possible instruments in the
exercise of hard hegemony, as well as military measures, as long as they do not
involve a threat of intervention, such as a weapons embargo or an interruption of
military assistance or cooperation.
If the dominant state follows a hard hegemonic strategy, the compliant
behaviour of subordinates derives mainly from the fact that ‘secondary states make
rational calculations about the expected costs of noncompliance’.96 This implies
that there is no real change in their normative orientation. Therefore, instead of
real legitimation based on the adoption of the norms and values promoted by the
hegemon, in hard hegemony we find something which could be called ‘pseudo-
legitimation’: subordinate states change their behaviour, but without internalising
the values promoted by the hegemon.
‘Intermediate hegemony’ is centred around the provision of material benefits
and rewards to subordinate states (as suggested by hegemonic stability theory) in
order to make them acquiescent. Moreover, norms and values are shared to a
certain degree between hegemon and subordinate states. In this case the hegemon
also pursues its narrow national interest and its own goals, and it also emphasises
the existence of common interests and objectives, shared with subordinates.
However, in intermediate hegemony the discrepancy between rhetorical commit-
ment and actual behaviour is less blatant than in hard hegemony, since the
hegemon renounces the use of threats and sanctions. The side-payments provided
by the hegemonic state are mainly of an economic nature: trade facilitation and
economic assistance (loans, development aid – with a particularly strong hegemonic
influence in the case of tied aid or conditionalities). However, as Pedersen
underlines, side-payments can also take the form of institutional power sharing.97
Military support can also play a role as reward or incentive for compliant
behaviour.98 This form of hegemonic strategy is based on what Knorr in his
distinction of forms of power defines as ‘reward power’: ‘It is influence based on
A’s promise of some sort of goal gratification to B on condition that B will supply
something of value to A.’ One of the means employed in intermediate hegemony
strategies is therefore bribery, which corresponds to a ‘prepaid reward’.99
In intermediate hegemony also, the compliance of subordinate states derives
from rational cost-benefit calculations. The existence, to a certain degree, of
common values and the absence of threat make the intermediate hegemonic
94 Ibid.
95 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, p. 287.
96 Ibid.
97 See Pedersen, ‘State Strategies and Informal Leadership’, p. 91.
98 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, p. 287.
99 Knorr, Power of Nations, p. 7.
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strategy more acceptable for subordinate states than the ‘hard’ one. As pinpointed
by Knorr: ‘Promises are commonly taken as less unfriendly than threats as a way
of manipulating relationships. B feels less put upon and is less likely to defy the
influence attempt. He receives something of value even if he also loses something
of value’.100 For this reason we can speak of a ‘partial legitimation’ of intermediate
hegemony.
‘Soft hegemony’ denotes a strategy which strongly resembles leadership.
However, in contrast to leadership, the ends and interests of the hegemon are still
at the forefront.101 This kind of hegemonic strategy is based on the hegemon’s
eﬀorts to modify and reshape the norms and values of subordinate states, as
illustrated by Ikenberry and Kupchan in their ‘normative persuasion’ model:
[. . .] the hegemon is able to alter the normative orientation and practices of secondary elites
without sanctions, inducements, or manipulation. Rather, the hegemon engages in a process
of socialization and ideological persuasion in which legitimacy emerges through the osmosis
of norms and values from dominant to secondary elites [. . .].102
The complex socialisation process also leads to a redefinition of the subordinate
state’s national interests in terms of the hegemon’s normative order and to a
transformation in its policies corresponding to the hegemon’s values and princi-
ples.103 As possible instruments to eﬃciently realise normative persuasion through
ideological persuasion and transnational learning, Ikenberry and Kupchan mention
various kinds of contact with elites in secondary states, for example, through
diplomatic channels, cultural exchange, and foreign students.104 In soft hegemony
the compliance of subordinate states does not derive from utilitarian calculations
but is rather a result of the convergence of norms and values. For this reason, soft
hegemony is the only form of hegemonic strategy which can obtain a full
legitimation by subordinate states.105
The three forms of hegemony outlined above can be conceived of as diﬀerent
specifications of the same concept. A transition from one form of hegemonic
strategy to the other is possible, if not probable. In fact, as Ikenberry and Kupchan
have underlined, the projection of norms and values (soft hegemonic strategy) can
follow a coercive moment (hard hegemonic strategy) or the provision of material
incentives (intermediate hegemonic strategy or, in their terminology, ‘external’ or
‘positive’ inducement).106 The authors argue that policy coercion and diﬀerent
forms of pressure represent a sort of ‘first stage’ in the process of establishment and
legitimation of international hegemony: the hegemon first forces subordinate states
100 Ibid., p. 8.
101 In this case, I will not follow Knorr, who argues that ‘Noncoercive influence, no matter how
one-sided, can bring about leadership but not hegemonial supremacy’. (Knorr, Power of Nations,
p. 24). Since what I have identified as the prominent feature of leadership is the pursuit of common
interests and goals (in contrast to the ‘one-sidedness’ of hegemony), I believe that one-sided
non-coercive influence should be subsumed under hegemony, thereby admitting the existence of a
cooperative, ‘soft’ form of hegemony. In his book, Knorr himself later emphasises that the essential
features of leadership are non-coercive influence and the ‘mutual flow of benefits’, thereby excluding
the hypothesis of one-sidedness for leadership.
102 Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 57.
103 Ibid.
104 See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, p. 290.
105 Ibid., ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 57.
106 Ibid., ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, pp. 290–2; ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’,
pp. 57–8, 65–8.
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to change their policies, and later, gradually, the elites in subordinate states adopt
the hegemon’s norms and values. This is what the authors call ‘acts before
beliefs’.107 The final objective of a hegemonic state is the establishment of an
accepted, uncontested and legitimated international order fixing hierarchical
asymmetries, since such an order is much ‘cheaper’ to manage because no use of
force or side-payments is necessary. But the attainment of such an uncontested
order may require, first, the employment of ‘harder’ strategies. The final attainment
of the hegemon’s goal, the successful diﬀusion of its norms and values, however,
is only of secondary importance here. The object of this study is the strategy used
by the hegemonic state to reach this final goal. Probably in most cases the complete
acquiescence of subordinate states is never achieved. In any case, socialisation
processes are very lengthy and diﬃcult to observe, in part because they are still
under way. If we just focus on the strategy of the dominant power, however, the
first step is to find out if the power aims to establish an international (or, in this
case, regional) order, allowing it to realise its goals without the need to resort to
the use of force (hegemony). The second stage would then consist of the
identification of the means preferred to establish this order, that is, the detection
of the hegemon’s choice of a ‘hard’, ‘intermediate’ or ‘soft’ hegemonic strategy.108
2.3 Leadership
Like empire and, to a greater extent, hegemony, leadership is a controversial
concept in IR theory. What is especially confusing is the sometimes undiﬀerenti-
ated usage of hegemony and leadership, which mainly derives from the theory of
hegemonic stability and its assumption that only a ‘hegemonic’ state with disposal
over predominant resources can assume a leadership position by providing public
goods.109
In this study I argue that there is a fundamental diﬀerence between hegemony
and leadership, which lies in the goals pursued by the dominant state: while the
hegemon aims to realise its own self-interested goals by presenting them as
common with those of subordinate states, the leader guides – ‘leads’ – a group of
states in order to realise or facilitate the realisation of their common objectives.
Some helpful tools for better grasping the meaning of leadership are theories
from social psychology and political science, the fields in which the study of
leadership began.110 While early studies were devoted to the identification of the
107 Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 58.
108 Of course the distinction between these three forms of hegemony is ideal-typical and tentative: in
reality dominant states most probably follow strategies lying somewhere between the three kinds
outlined above. What will be relevant for analysis, therefore, is a ‘prevalence’ in the use of
coercive/threatening, coopting/rewarding/inducing, or convincing/persuading means.
109 For a critique of this aspect of the theory of hegemonic stability see Jarrod Wiener, Making Rules
in the Uruguay Round of the GATT: A Study of International Leadership (Aldershot: Dartmouth,
1995).
110 For an overview on this early literature see Glenn D. Paige, The Scientific Study of Political
Leadership (New York, NY/London: The Free Press, 1977), especially chap. 3; Ralph M. Stogdill,
Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research (New York, NY/London: The Free Press,
1974); George R. Goethals, Georgia J. Sorenson and MacGregor James Burns (eds), Encyclopedia
of Leadership (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2004); Peter G. Northouse, Leadership: Theory and
Practice (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1997).
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character traits and attributes of great public figures, starting in the 1960s various
theories aiming to provide managers with useful instruments to improve their
leadership style began to deal with the relationship between leader and followers.111
For instance, the ‘situational approach’ studied the ways in which leaders have to
adapt their leadership style to diﬀerent situations in order to recognise the needs
of their subordinates and to cooperate with them. On the basis of Burns’ work,112
the ability of leaders to influence their followers became a central object of study
in the 1980s, thereby implying that leadership excludes the exercise of power and
coercion since great significance is attributed to the followers’ needs.113 Leadership
was therefore conceived of as ‘transformational’: leaders are able to alter the
motives and preferences of followers, but they are in turn influenced. Therefore,
leader and followers ‘share a common cause’.114 Northouse has summarised the
salient aspects of this whole range of social psychological leadership theories as
follows: ‘[. . .] (a) leadership is a process, (b) leadership involves influence, (c)
leadership occurs within a group context, and (d) leadership involves goal
attainment’. From these points, the following definition is derived: ‘Leadership is
a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a
common goal’.115
The aim of this brief digression is to underline how various theories outside the
discipline of IR have conceptualised leadership as an interaction between leader and
followers on the basis of common goals. This conception is radically diﬀerent from
the materialistic assumptions made by the theory of hegemonic stability, which
identifies leadership with the provision of public goods, and from ‘transactional’
accounts highlighting the role of mutual gains and benefits in the exercise of
leadership. For instance, according to Knorr, the essential features of leadership in
IR are represented by the absence of coercion and the reciprocal flow of benefits:
‘[. . .] one actor gives something of value to another without condition, without any
stipulated payment, now or later’.116 Fitting examples are the case of the creation of
a custom union, ‘from the establishment of which all participants would gain – not
one from the other, but all from sharing newly created values, in this case, of an
economic nature’.117 Or the case in which ‘A acts as a successful mediary in bringing
conflict between B and C to a conclusion that is acceptable to both, and preferable
to continued conflict’.118 According to this perspective, as Young put it in his article
on institutional bargaining, ‘Leadership [. . .] refers to the actions of individuals
who endeavor to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague
the eﬀorts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in a process of institutional
bargaining’.119
The transactional approach, focused on an exchange of benefits, might be of
importance for leadership, but we should go a step further and conceive of
111 For an overview, see Northouse, Leadership, pp. 32–73.
112 See James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1978).
113 See Northouse, Leadership, pp. 130–58.
114 Goethals, Sorenson and Burns (eds), Encyclopedia of Leadership, p. 870.
115 Northouse, Leadership, p. 3.
116 Knorr, Power of Nations, p. 311.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Oran R. Young, ‘Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions
in International Society’, International Organization, 45 (1991), p. 285.
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leadership as being characterised by the pursuit of common objectives and,
therefore, by a commonality of interests between leader and followers.120 This trait
of leadership, developed by social psychological theories, has been taken over by
some authors in the field of IR. However, the equation of leadership with
hegemony has prevented many authors from taking into consideration the
perspective of the followers and, as a consequence, the idea of a commonality of
goals between leader and followers.121 In fact, as Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal
have demonstrated, the interests and motivations of followers are of central
importance in conceptualising leadership – and ignoring the dynamics of follow-
ership can be misleading. Thus, the USA did not exercise ‘real’ leadership in the
second Gulf War, even though their allies seemed to ‘follow’, because there was a
lack of common interests and goals.122 ‘For in order to give leadership concrete
meaning, a leader must have followers, those willing to buy into a broad vision of
collective goals articulated by a leader in whom both legitimacy and trust are
placed’.123
As Wiener underlines, international leadership should be studied from a
behavioural perspective, independently of the possession of material power
resources by the leader.124 More generally, we can aﬃrm that leadership does not
imply in a strict sense the exercise of power by the leader since the followers’
participation is voluntary and in their own interest. The provision of incentives or
side-payments is not relevant for understanding leadership. On the contrary,
leadership implies ‘[. . .] leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that
represent the values and motivations – the wants and the needs, the aspirations and
the expectations – of both leader and followers’.125
How, then, does international leadership take place? On the basis of the
relevant literature, I argue that two kinds of leadership exist, depending on who
initiates the leadership relationship. In this case also, Ikenberry and Kupchan’s
models of ‘hegemonic’ order are helpful. On the one hand, in the ‘normative
persuasion’ model presented above, the ‘hegemon’ (in this case, the leader) ‘[. . .]
120 On the distinction between ‘transactional’ and ‘transformational’ leadership see Goethals, Sorenson
and Burns (eds), Encyclopedia of Leadership, p. 870. The focus on a commonality of gains between
leaders and followers could be misleading in defining leadership: in fact, a state following an
intermediate – or soft – hegemony strategy might also reap joint gains with its subordinates. As the
theory of hegemonic stability tells us, subordinate states take advantage of the collective goods
provided by the hegemon – and gain even more than the hegemon itself since they act as free riders.
But this does not necessarily mean that they willingly follow the leader in the eﬀort to reach common
goals.
121 The theory of hegemonic stability, for example, is focused on the capabilities possessed by the
hegemonic power and on the provision of public goods. In this context, the secondary states are
merely taken into consideration as free riders or, as Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal point out, ‘to
ascertain that such states do not possess attributes of power quite like the hegemon and, therefore,
can be safely ruled out as “contenders” or “challengers” to the leading state’. See Andrew Fenton
Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow? Leadership and
Followership in the Gulf Conflict’, Political Science Quarterly, 106 (1991), p. 394.
122 See Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow?’, p. 399.
123 Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow?’, p. 408. For an interesting analysis on the responses
by small regional states to the power of the dominant states (regionally and globally) see Amitav
Acharya, ‘The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics’, World Politics, 59 (2007) pp.
629–52. See also, Schirm, ‘Leaders in Need of Followers’.
124 See Jarrod Wiener, ‘Hegemonic Leadership: Naked Emperor or the Worship of False Gods?’
European Journal of International Relations, 1 (1995) pp. 219–43.
125 Burns, Leadership, p. 19.
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engages in a process of socialization and ideological persuasion in which legitimacy
emerges through the osmosis of norms and values from dominant to secondary
elites’.126 On the other hand, the authors develop two legitimation models based on
the voluntary participation of followers: the first, named ‘endogenous learning’, is
based on the development of identical norms and values in diﬀerent states due to
coincidence or to a common reaction to structural conditions.127 The second, the
‘emulation’ model, is focused on the adoption by the followers of the dominant
state’s norms and policies in an eﬀort to imitate its success, but without attempts
by the leader to influence their normative orientations or policies.
2.3.1 Leader-initiated leadership
The first possible way of establishing international leadership originates from the
initiative of the leader. In this case the leader’s strategy is based on its engagement
in a socialisation process with the aim of creating shared norms and values and
generating ‘true’ followership.
The leader may have to consult, to explain, to persuade, even on occasion to cajole. But
because followership involves followers intertwining their own interests with those of a
leader in whom they place confidence and trust, these followers are likely not simply to
defer and acquiesce to the leader, but to willingly follow that leader.128
This model corresponds to the ‘normative persuasion’ process outlined by
Ikenberry and Kupchan. The diﬀerence between this leader-initiated leadership and
hegemonic normative persuasion lies, as specified above, in the goals pursued: in
soft hegemony, the hegemon promotes its own norms and values for the realisation
of its own interests and objectives, while in leadership the goals striven for are
collective. It is also possible that the socialisation process initiated by the leader
makes followers aware of their group interests or of an existing commonality of
interest with the leading state. In this context, I hypothesise that soft hegemony and
leadership can represent diﬀerent strategies in an ongoing process: the hegemon
initiates a socialisation process with the aim of realising its own objectives, but in a
second stage the adoption of its norms and values by subordinate states leads to a
commonality of ends and interests, thereby transforming subordinates into follow-
ers. It is at this point that the dynamic and interactive character of strategy emerges,
which is based on the assumption that ‘[. . .] states may learn and in the process
incorporate causal ideas and principled beliefs in revised state strategies’.129
2.3.2 Follower-initiated leadership
Although the second kind of leadership relationship does not correspond to a
strategy a regional power could adopt, I consider it useful to deal with it briefly
126 Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Legitimation of Hegemonic Power’, p. 57.
127 Instead of endogenous ‘learning’ we should, however, talk about endogenous ‘adaptation’. Learning
implies an active, conscious process, while in this case we are dealing with an almost automatic and
unconscious reaction to a given situation or context.
128 Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow?’, p. 398.
129 Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony’, p. 683.
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in order to clarify the diﬀerence between a regional leadership strategy pursued by
the regional power and a leadership relationship emerging from the initiative of the
smaller states in the region which are in need of a leader in order to achieve their
common goals. This particular impulse for leadership derives as a logical
consequence from the adoption of a ‘bottom-up’ perspective, which not only
concentrates on the leader but places the followers in the centre of the analysis. A
group of states can be too heterogeneous or simply too weak to reach a collective
goal – and therefore in need of a leader to become capable of acting. This might
happen, following Tucker’s reflections on political leadership, in two diﬀerent
situations: in crisis situations or, more specifically, if the group is threatened from
outside, and in the ‘everyday business’ of IR.130
In the first case, the leader will help the group achieve the common goal of
defending itself or of reacting to the crisis situation by assuming a ‘directive’ function.
The followers will ask the leading state for help or, at least, for support in terms of
coordination: ‘A leader is one who gives direction to a collective’s activities’.131
In the second case, the leader is induced by followers to adopt a ‘managerial’
function, helping them ‘organizing action’132 in order to reach their objectives. This
implies that common norms and values and especially shared ends already exist
among the group of states constituted by leader and followers – the aspect outlined
in Ikenberry and Kupchan’s ‘endogenous learning’ model described above. The
leader therefore does not have to launch a socialisation process, but just has to
bundle the interests of the group and ‘lead’ its followers towards their realisation.
Regardless of the initiator of leadership, in any case we can aﬃrm (and this is
one of the few points on which most leadership theories agree)133 that international
leadership is always legitimated. This is due to the commonality of goals and to the
convergence of norms and values between leader and followers: ‘[. . .] followers see
the leader as legitimately placed to make decisions on their behalf’.134 By hypoth-
esising the existence of truly ‘benevolent’ leadership strategies, I do not intend to
assume that states act completely ‘altruistically’ or against their own interests. This
is simply not imaginable. Nor do I claim that the kind of leadership strategy and
relationship outlined above is common in the empirical reality of IR. However, the
pursuit of common goals is not that unusual, at least in certain policy areas; I thus
consider the inclusion of leadership in this discussion about the ideal-typical
strategies of regional powers to be adequate and helpful.
3. Overview and research design implications
Following this theory-led conceptual clarification of ideal-typical strategies pursued
by regional powers, the main findings are recapitulated in Table 1 according to
130 See Robert C. Tucker, Politics as Leadership (Columbia, Mo/London: University of Missouri Press,
1981), pp. 15–8.
131 Tucker, Politics as Leadership, p. 15.
132 Wiener, ‘Hegemonic Leadership’, p. 223.
133 See for example, Wiener, ‘Hegemonic Leadership’, pp. 225–6; Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, ‘Bound
to Follow?’, p. 398; David P. Rapkin, ‘Japan and World Leadership?’, in David P. Rapkin (ed.),
World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Col./London: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p. 196.
134 Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow?’, p. 398.
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Empire Hegemony Leadership
Hard Intermediate Soft Leader-initiated Follower-initiated
Brief definition System of
domination based
on the use or
threat of military
intervention
Establishment of
an order for the
realisation of the
hegemon’s goals
through coercion,
but without
recourse to military
power
Establishment of
an order for the
realisation of the
hegemon’s goals
through the
provision of
material benefits
Establishment of
an order for the
realisation of the
hegemon’s goals
through normative
persuasion and
socialisation
Pursuit of common
goals through a
socialisation
process launched
by the leader
Pursuit of already
existing common
goals through the
conferring upon
the leader of a
directive or
managerial
function
Ends Self-interested Self-interested Self-interested Self-interested Common Common
Means Military
intervention, threat
of intervention
Sanctions, threats,
political pressure
Material
benefits/
inducements:
economic
side-payments,
military support
Normative
persuasion,
socialisation (for
example, through
joint working
groups or
committees on
contentious issues)
Normative
persuasion,
socialisation
process
Acceptance of
directive or
managerial
function
Self-representation Aggressive,
threatening,
compelling
subordination
Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative
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Empire Hegemony Leadership
Hard Intermediate Soft Leader-initiated Follower-initiated
Discrepancy
between
self-representation
and actual
behaviour
Low High Middle Low Low Low
Legitimation No legitimation Pseudo-legitimation Partial legitimation Legitimation Legitimation Legitimation
Subordinate states’
strategies
Resistance or
subordination
Resistance. If
hegemonic strategy
successful:
compliance based
on rational
calculations about
the costs of
non-compliance
(Resistance). If
hegemonic strategy
successful:
compliance based
on rational
cost-benefit
calculations
Compliance based
on redefinition of
norms and values
Willing
followership
Initiation of
leadership as
reaction to a
threat/crisis or
because of lack of
coordination
Change in
subordinate states’
normative
orientation due to
dominant state’s
policy
No No No Yes Yes (No)
Source: Author’s compilation.
Table 1. Main features of empire, hegemony and leadership
R
egional
pow
ers
and
their
strategies
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several dimensions identified as relevant. Since follower-initiated leadership origi-
nates from the initiative of the regional power’s smaller neighbouring states, it is
not considered to be a strategy pursued by the regional power. The fields marked
in grey in Table 1 therefore represent the possible strategies regional powers can
adopt.
The notions of empire, hegemony, and leadership appear particularly useful for
characterising a continuum of strategies employed by regionally powerful states. In
fact, the multi-dimensional nature of these concepts not only allows for a
classification of observed behaviours but also takes into account a much broader
range of dimensions related to the interaction of the regional power with its
neighbours in the region, such as the strategies of these subordinate states, the
degree to which they confer legitimacy to the regional power, and possible
alterations in their normative orientation.
When it comes to operationalising these concepts for empirical research,
however, a reduction in the number of dimensions considered seems to be
appropriate. On the basis of the theory-led discussion developed above, I argue
that two elements are central to distinguishing imperial, hard/intermediate/soft
hegemonic, and leading strategies. These two essential discriminating factors are: a)
the commonality or divergence in the goals pursued by the regional power and
neighbouring countries and, b) the means employed by the regional power in its
relations with these countries. In fact, on the one hand, a commonality of goals
represents the distinctive feature of leadership and of a leading strategy. On the
other hand, it is through an analysis of the means employed by the regional power
that we can distinguish an imperial strategy, based on the use of military power or
on the threat of military intervention through an ultimatum, from a hegemonic
strategy. Moreover, taking into consideration the means employed allows us to
diﬀerentiate between hard, intermediate, and soft hegemony, since hard hegemony
is essentially based on coercive measures, intermediate hegemony on diﬀerent kinds
of incentives and side-payments, and soft hegemony on normative persuasion and
an eﬀort at initiating a socialisation process in subordinate states. A deeper
analysis of soft hegemony and leadership would imply considering the discursive
processes taking place in the relations between the regional power and subordinate
states. In addition to the two essential elements, means and ends, further
dimensions such as the reactions or, more generally, the behaviour of subordinate
states in the region can be analysed. From a deeper understanding of the
interaction between regional power and subordinate states one can gain interesting
insights into the dynamics of how regional power’s strategies evolve and flexibly
adapt to the conditions of the regional environment. In a second stage, further
dimensions such as the kind of self-representation undertaken by the regional
power or the degree of legitimation it enjoys among its regional neighbours can be
taken into consideration in order to confirm the results obtained.
Conclusion
The conceptual clarification of the notions of empire, hegemony, and leadership
has allowed us to identify several dimensions according to which these possible
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strategies of regional powers are comparable. It is this comparability of the single
dimensions of imperial, hegemonic, and leading strategies which allows us to
consider them as being arrayed along a continuum. And it is precisely by realising
that regional powers can pursue a whole range of strategies along this continuum
that we can contribute to the development of a more convincing theorisation of
regional powers. Beginning with the idea that a regional power is a state which
belongs to a region, disposes of superior power capabilities, and exercises an
influence on regional neighbours, we can analyse the strategies this state pursues in
dealing with these neighbours without running the risk of biasing our research by
assuming that, if we are dealing with a regional power, the strategies adopted must
necessarily be ‘leading’ or ‘cooperatively hegemonic’, as is suggested in a large part
of the literature presented at the beginning of this article. The clarification,
combination, and integration of existing approaches leads, therefore, to a
broadening of the notion of regional powers which goes beyond current concep-
tualisations of ‘regional leading powers’ or ‘regional hegemons’ by admitting that
regional powers can also pursue coercive, compelling, aggressive, or threatening
foreign policy strategies in dealing with neighbour countries.
Some concluding remarks have to be made at this point. The distinctions
between the features of empire, hegemony, and leadership are, as outlined above,
ideal-typical. This implies that probably only rarely will a state follow a ‘pure’
imperial, hard/intermediate/soft hegemonic, or leading strategy. This is especially
important for the three diﬀerent forms of hegemony, since hegemonic regional
powers will probably adopt a combination of material and ideational inducements
to spread the norms, values, and conceptions of order most suitable to their
interests. The ideal-typical categories developed in this article should therefore act
as a guideline for analysis, but what most probably will be identified in empirical
research are situations in which a particular form of strategic orientation prevails.
Moreover, since strategy is dynamic and subject to learning processes,135 I assume
that regional powers can modify their strategies in the course of time, passing, for
instance, from a hard to an intermediate hegemonic strategy or from a soft
hegemonic strategy to a leading strategy in response to changed reactions by
subordinate states, to domestic factors redefining state priorities, or to pressures
deriving from the external environment, for example, from global powers.
Moreover, interesting results from empirical studies could be gained by
applying the conceptual framework developed above to the study of the strategies
a regional power pursues in diﬀerent issue areas. Most probably, one would find
that a regional power pursues a simultaneous policy mix of diﬀerent strategies
according to the policy area analysed. In this context, one could assume that much
harder strategies are adopted in the field of security than in economic relations. In
a similar way, the adoption of diversified strategies towards diﬀerent neighbouring
countries seems to be a plausible hypothesis.
The conceptual framework developed in this article is therefore useful in three
regards. First, it allows for a more diversified conceptualisation of regional powers.
A regional power is therefore considered to be a regionally predominant state
exercising an influence on the region to which it belongs by pursuing, in relation
to its neighbours, strategies which can be imperial, hegemonic, or leading.
135 See Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony’, p. 683.
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Second, the conceptual clarification of empire, hegemony, and leadership allows
for a better distinction of the strategies pursued by the regional power when it
comes to analysing them empirically. Third, and related to the previous point, by
permitting a clear classification of regional powers’ strategies, this conceptual
framework also serves as a basis and a point of departure for future research. In
fact, one could consider the strategies identified as the dependent variable and ask
what factors lead a regional power to adopt them, thereby studying the interplay
of domestic factors and extra-regional pressures – that is, the complex interplay of
levels of analysis – on the regional power’s decision making process. On the other
hand – and this aspect seems even more intriguing – one could ask what
consequences the adoption of a particular kind of strategy has for the degree of
stability or instability, cooperation or conflict, or the integration of the region –
that is, in which ways the strategies adopted by the regional power and the ways
neighbouring states interact with it contribute to shaping the regional order.
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